Russian Dual-Use Products Contractor Quietly Moves to Slovakia Amid War
Representatives of the Russian company Mirelix, which supplied electronics to the Russian secret service (FSB), established a base in Slovakia after the start of the war in Ukraine. Public data suggests that the company continued its deliveries even after the full-scale invasion of the country in February 2022. An analyst warns that similar cases could pose a security risk and that the electronics could also have been used in Russian ballistic missiles and guided missiles.
The St. Petersburg-based company Mirelix presents itself as a reliable distributor of electrical engineering and electronic components from global manufacturers in the military sector. In the past, it has won several government contracts, including one with the Russian secret service, or FSB, Russia’s main domestic secret service.
According to our information, the couple behind Mirelix moved to Slovakia after the outbreak of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. ICJK’s findings from public databases indicate that the company may have continued to supply electronic components to one of the FSB units even after February 2022, i.e. after the start of Russia’s all-out aggression in Ukraine.
The company’s largest client was Unit 45187 of the FSB. According to experts, this is one of its most secretive units. Mirelix also supplied products to other military units involved in the development of guided missiles and nuclear technologies.
According to public records, the new contracts date from after the start of the Russian invasion in 2022. They included radio components, power supplies, and silicon generators—all technologies that can be used in the military industry. For example, generators of this type can be used as part of a ballistic missile guidance system.
Military analyst Vladimír Bednár warned that this could pose a security risk for Slovakia. According to him, based on similar cases abroad, it can be assumed “that not only these companies and citizens pose a security risk to us, but that they are directly agents of Russian intelligence services who have been operating on our territory for a long time under the guise of legitimate business activities.”
The Czech secret service has long warned that the activities of Russian individuals or companies with links to the Russian military-industrial complex pose a significant security risk not only to Slovakia, but to our entire region. A spokesperson for the Czech Security Information Service (BIS) added that business activities are among the methods traditionally used to conceal the activities of intelligence services. “Traditional cover includes the professions of journalist, trader, or entrepreneur,” explained Ladislav Šticha of the BIS. The Slovak Information Service did not respond to our questions by the deadline.
It is not clear whether Mirelix continues to supply Russian military units even after its owners moved to Slovakia. We did not receive a response from company representatives to the question of whether they supplied products from other European Union countries or from Slovakia to Russia.
From St. Petersburg to Slovakia
According to its own description, the St. Petersburg-based company Mirelix imports electrical equipment and electronic components from many global manufacturers to Russia. It also states that it has “excellent results in projects with private and public organizations, including those operating in the military and defense sectors.” Records from public databases on tenders in Russia confirm this claim. Their regular and most important state customer is the Russian secret service, the FSB.
An inconspicuous website of the Russian company Mirelix. Source: mirelix.ru
The most recent contracts, for example for radio components for the FSB, appeared in the registers in 2023, after the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. At that time, the leaders of Mirelix, the Trojanovskys, may no longer have been operating in Russia. The company’s CEO, Igor Trojanovsky, started a business in Slovakia just two months after the Russian attack on Ukraine. In the summer of 2022, he bought an apartment near Bratislava.
His wife Maria is the founder of Mirelix. According to her activities on social media, her family has been living in our region and the wider area in recent years. However, it is not possible to determine from public databases exactly when they arrived in Slovakia. Nor is it clear whether or on what basis they obtained temporary or permanent residence in Slovakia. We asked the Ministry of the Interior, which is responsible for the foreign police, about this. Due to personal data protection, the police did not disclose this information.
We also tried to contact representatives of the Russian company. Among other things, we were interested in whether the company continued to fulfill existing contracts with state entities in Russia after February 24, 2022, and whether the company is managed from Slovakia. No one answered the official phone numbers, and they did not respond to our queries by the stated deadline. We also tried, unsuccessfully, to reach them at their Slovak address and the address where Igor Trojanovsky registered his business.
Suppliers for the FSB
According to available Russian financial statements, Mirelix is still active, though its revenue has been gradually declining over the past few years. In the year the Russian invasion began, its revenue was over 12 million rubles (approximately 154,000 euros for 2022); a year later, 6 million rubles (just under 54,000 euros).
Since its establishment, the company has had several government contracts. Most of them were with FSB unit 45187, mainly signed in 2017. Mirelix is one of the top five suppliers to this secret service unit in terms of total contract volume. It is also engaged in research and development of new technologies for Russian intelligence services. According to military analyst Vladimir Bednar, “by its very nature, [unit 45187] is one of the most secret parts of the FSB.”
The FSB building on the square in Moscow, Source: Shutterstock
According to The Insider’s findings from 2023, it was this FSB unit that was supplied by Russian importers who purchased American microchips despite sanctions. These were dual-use technologies, meaning they can be used for both civilian and military purposes.
However, this unit is not the only one with a military background among Mirelix’s clients. Another is unit number 45185. Bednár points out that this is a little-known part of the Russian armed forces. “In the past, this unit has been known to procure high-precision machines used to manufacture mechanical components for guided missiles, such as the Kh-101 cruise missile,” the analyst explained. The Russian side also used these [missiles] against Ukrainian targets—to attack cities and civilian energy infrastructure.
Mirelix also delivered a smaller order for electronic time switches to unit number 52015. This unit is involved in the development, production, operation, and storage of nuclear weapons. Military analyst Bednár added that it ranks higher in the hierarchy of Russian security forces than, for example, the GRU military intelligence service.
Dual-Use Products
The content of Mirelix’s latest contracts with the FSB unit from 2022 and 2023 was supposed to be radio components, power supplies, and silicon generators. These are dual-use electrical engineering products. It is not clear from the data whether they were actually delivered.
Military analyst Vladimír Bednár explained that silicon generators are components that generate very precise pulses. “They are used, for example, as components in the guidance systems of Russian guided missiles. Considering the military unit that was supposed to receive these components, it is very likely that they were used as components for the production of Russian ballistic missiles and cruise missiles,” the expert pointed out. He added that the same applies to other radio components that can be used in many highly sophisticated military and intelligence areas.
According to Matej Kandrík, an analyst and director of the Adapt Institute, a Bratislava-based think tank, many civilian products can have military applications. “Especially when we are talking about indestructible materials, as in this case,” he said, noting that enforcing sanctions in this area is a major challenge and that circumventing them has become a lucrative business.
According to experts, the Kremlin uses complex financial schemes, falsification of the origin of goods, and trade through third countries to circumvent sanctions. And according to the Czech Security Information Service (BIS), every year their secret service uncovers and stops dozens of cases in which certain entities attempt to circumvent sanctions and export goods to the Russian Federation that can also be used in the arms industry.
The investigative center Dossier also contributed to the research for this article.
The Slovak version of this story was published on ICJK.sk.
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Karin Kőváry Sólymos is a Slovak journalist at the Investigative Center of Ján Kuciak. Previously, she was an editor and presenter at the Hungarian channel of the Slovak public service media. During her university years, she was an analyst for the only fact-checking portal in Slovakia. She was a recipient of the Novinarska Cena 2022.