The Era of Orbánism as an Exportable Model May Be Ending
Illustration: Viktor Orbán's Facebook page 2025-09-14
Illustration: Viktor Orbán's Facebook page 2025-09-14
Hungarian PM Viktor Orbán’s once-admired “illiberal model” is faltering — plagued by economic crisis, voter frustration, and collapsing governance. With the 2026 election looming, his future — and the global appeal of his system — is at stake as his government faces its biggest political test.
Viktor Orbán is facing political challenges the likes of which he has not seen in 20 years. His system is cracking on the levels that matter most: stability, economic performance, and governance. Consequently, the “Orbán model,” considered successful in recent years, is looking less appealing around the world. The 2026 parliamentary elections will have implications beyond Hungary. National leaders with similar political systems will likely be watching closely to see if Orbán, who has established a unique information autocracy within the European Union (EU), will remain in power.
In recent years, the Orbán regime has devoted major public resources to promoting its political system as an exportable model and boosting its global influence. As Political Capital showed in an earlier study, these efforts have been successful from the regime’s perspective: Viktor Orbán has attracted far more attention than Hungary’s international weight would suggest, becoming the standard-bearer of illiberalism and a star of the global populist and far-right movement.
The Successes of Exporting Illiberalism
This was indicated as early as 2015 by a cover of British weekly The Economist. The cover showed Hungary’s prime minister alongside Donald Trump and Marine Le Pen under the headline “Playing with Fear.” Orbán’s influence in Europe grew during the refugee crisis, when his radical stance made him a model for anti-immigration parties.
In Austria’s 2024 election campaign, Herbert Kickl, leader of the Freedom Party (FPÖ), cited the “Orbán model” as an example. Three years after Fidesz was expelled from the European People’s Party (EPP) in 2021, Orbán’s party helped found the Patriots for Europe (PfE) faction in the European Parliament. While Fidesz never regained the clout it had within the EPP, it fought its way back into European party politics.
Beyond Europe, Orbán built key relationships by consistently supporting Donald Trump. During the 2024 U.S. presidential debate, Trump praised him as a strong European leader. Prominent American writers like Anne Applebaum and Francis Fukuyama have even argued that Orbán’s system could serve as a model for the MAGA movement now dominating the Republican Party.
Orbán actively cultivated his image as a role model. In May 2022, he hosted the first European Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) in Budapest, promoting Trumpist ideas. The event was organized by the Fidesz-aligned Center for Fundamental Rights. At the conference, Orbán presented his “recipe for success” to American and European conservatives in 12 points. A few months later, he presented these points at a CPAC event in Dallas, Texas. Thus, according to Orbán, conservatives must
- create communities organized on a political basis;
- take the majority position of society in public affairs;
- pursue successful economic policies that provide jobs for people and support traditional families;
- build their own media and political institutions, as well as international alliances;
- be a taboo-breaker, but must not be pushed to the margins.
While this playbook has done little to advance Hungary as a country, it has worked from the regime’s perspective. The strategic goal of exporting illiberalism is to secure the long-term survival of Orbán’s political system by shaping a foreign policy environment favorable to it. With the backing of like-minded populist forces, the regime seeks an “illiberal hegemonic shift” — one in which it no longer faces criticism or sanctions for dismantling the rule of law or for systemic corruption.
For years, Orbán successfully convinced Hungarians that his system was uniquely efficient, claiming it delivered development, halted immigration, and addressed the demographic crisis. He cast himself as the leading figure of an international network opposed to liberal democracies, with allies ranging from Donald Trump and European populists to Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping. Orbán used this image to position himself as a challenger to the political mainstream and a prophet of a coming global realignment — insisting he was “not right now, but will be right later.”
That image has begun to fade. Many pillars of the Orbán model have crumbled. The Hungarian economy has struggled for years, eroding the system’s stability. A cost-of-living crisis — driven by the EU’s highest inflation — has fueled voter frustration. Over the past year and a half, the opposition party TISZA (short for Respect and Freedom — and also the name of a river in Hungary) has emerged as a credible political alternative, channeling public discontent.
Hungary’s political system still falls far short of fair competition, so next year’s election remains highly unpredictable. Yet those in power are clearly uneasy about the regime’s future. This was apparent in Orbán’s unusually weak and hollow speech at the Fidesz-affiliated summer university in Băile Tușnad (Tusnádfürdő), Romania, in July. This annual event is typically where Orbán lays out his grand vision of the world. In 2014, he famously declared his plan to build an “illiberal state” there — a statement that drew global attention. This year, however, he offered little beyond warning of World War III and vowing to keep Hungary out of it.
Economic Crisis and Stagnation
When looking for reasons behind the lack of tangible economic results, it is worth asking how well the Orbán government has met its own definition of success. In 2022, outlining his 12-point playbook, the prime minister said of the economy:
“Even those who did not vote for us end up better off… In the end, people want jobs, not economic theories. They want to take a step forward in life and provide a better life for their children than they have had. If a right-wing government is unable to deliver all this, it is doomed to failure.”
Over the past two to three years, his government has delivered none of this.
Since the mid-2010s, most Hungarians genuinely felt they were getting ahead. Research by renowned sociologist Imre Kovách shows that, starting in 2015, the middle and upper classes prospered the most, but even lower-income groups experienced some improvement. Compared with the difficult decades after 1990, this represented a major shift — one that strengthened the political system Orbán built after 2010. Yet this upturn was driven less by the regime’s policies and more by a global economic boom and a flood of EU money.
That perception changed after the 2022 parliamentary elections. A cascade of crises — the pandemic, the war in Ukraine, the energy crunch, and government corruption combined with the dismantling of the rule of law that led to the freezing of EU funds — triggered a radical economic shift.
Real wages began falling in late 2022, and by 2023 Hungary had the highest inflation rate in the EU. In the first quarter of 2023, real wages dropped by 15.6 percent, compared to an average 3.8 percent decline in OECD countries — the sharpest fall in Hungary in a decade. This collapse in purchasing power caused consumption to plummet, at times dropping to levels last seen during pandemic lockdowns.
As always, the Orbán government deflected blame, pointing to external factors: the war, EU sanctions on Russia, “Brussels,” even the Biden administration. By 2025, the government went as far as claiming that EU funds — suspended years earlier — were blocked because of the opposition TISZA party, founded in 2024.
But after 15 years in power, this ever-changing list of enemies and endless finger-pointing have lost credibility with many voters.
Fidesz’s loss of popularity is often traced to the clemency scandal of February 2024, when then-president Katalin Novák pardoned a former orphanage deputy director convicted of helping cover up his boss’s pedophile crimes. But disillusionment had already set in. Voters who had backed Fidesz in exchange for generous pre-election handouts were drifting away by late 2022. The clemency scandal merely accelerated a slow erosion of Fidesz’s still-substantial voter base — largely for economic reasons.
The government promised a rapid recovery in 2024 and a “flying start” in 2025. Neither materialized. Growth remains sluggish. Investment is down 20 percent compared to five years ago. Employment is now falling for the first time in years. Although real wages have recently ticked up, few households have felt the difference.
Meanwhile, the government’s price controls and profit-margin caps have failed to tame inflation. Food prices — the most politically sensitive measure — rose 5.9 percent in May compared to a year earlier. Compared to two years ago, they are up 7 percent, and compared to three years ago, nearly 43 percent. As the recent U.S. presidential election campaign shows, few issues are more politically destructive than rising food prices.
Failed Political Governance
The Orbán regime’s spectacular failures in public policy are closely linked to its economic troubles. For years, even many government critics conceded that Fidesz was “at least capable of governing.” A majority of Hungarians thought the government handled the 2015 refugee crisis effectively, and a similar view prevailed during the pandemic — despite Hungary suffering one of the highest per-capita COVID mortality rates in the world.
But the myth of “political governance” — the idea that professional expertise could be sidelined in favor of one man’s willpower — began to fade in 2023. Dissatisfaction has since grown sharply, especially over healthcare, social policy, public services (child protection, housing subsidies), and public transportation. On these issues, the government has lost the support of much of society. It’s no coincidence that Péter Magyar and his TISZA party have made them central to their political platform since 2024.
Two areas are even more crucial for the declining international appeal of the Orbán model: migration and demographics. The regime has long presented itself as a model in both fields. Orbán’s allies across Europe still praise Hungary’s hardline immigration policies, and the country’s generous family-support system has drawn admiration from figures such as Jordan Peterson and Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni.
The data, however, tell a different story: the Orbán government has neither stopped migration nor reversed population decline.
A clear example of policy failure is the guest worker system. For years, the government has struggled with the contradiction between its economic need for labor and its extreme anti-immigration rhetoric. By 2023, the number of non-EU guest workers in Hungary had risen to 120,000. The figure did not climb higher not because of government restrictions, but because the economic slowdown reduced demand for labor.
Meanwhile, despite being proud of erecting a barbed-wire fence on the southern border, the government has not been particularly successful in curbing illegal migration either. Austria has repeatedly closed its border with Hungary to stem the flow of illegal migrants. Hungary’s credibility was further damaged when the government released more than 2,400 foreign human traffickers from its prisons starting in 2023.
Demographic policy has fared no better. Although family benefits remain popular, they have not achieved the stated goal of increasing births. In 2024, just 77,500 children were born in Hungary — the lowest number since 1949. According to Hungary’s Central Statistical Office (KSH), the fertility rate fell to 1.3 in the first quarter of 2025, its lowest level in 15 years. Women are having children later, divorce rates are climbing, and emigration — especially among young, educated Hungarians — continues to rise. As a result, Hungary’s population is shrinking rapidly.
Family support schemes, lavishly promoted international demographic summits, “family-friendly” branding, slogans about protecting traditional families, political Christianity, and homophobia disguised as “child protection” have done little to reverse these trends. Taken together, these developments cast serious doubt on whether Orbán’s demographic policies can still be sold as a success story.
Losing Stability
By 2024, several factors had combined to produce a credible political alternative: rising anti-government sentiment fueled by the economic crisis and public policy failures, the fallout from the clemency scandal, public anger over systemic corruption and the Fidesz elite’s lavish lifestyle, frustration with the discredited former opposition parties, and fatigue after 15 years of uninterrupted Orbánism.
There is now a sense of political energy in Hungary not seen in years. People who once stayed out of politics are getting involved, and the ruling party is being challenged in areas and among voter groups that were once its strongholds. Although Orbán’s media and propaganda machine still dominates the public sphere — one of his key criteria for success — its effectiveness is clearly waning.
Even the hallmark of the “Orbán model” — its prized stability — seems to be slipping. Orbán has long boasted internationally that, while European governments rise and fall, his remains steady, making him and Fidesz the EU’s most experienced and powerful political players.
But heading into the 2026 parliamentary elections, many Hungarians increasingly feel that this stability costs them more than it benefits them. That sentiment could become the starting point for real political change.
Fidesz is struggling to adjust to this new landscape. Instead of facing a fragmented and weak opposition, it now faces a united bloc of voters rallying behind a popular new party and leader. The tools and tactics that kept Orbán in power for the past 15 years are losing their edge.
Foreign Policy Uncertainty
Paradoxically, in today’s political climate, the Orbán regime — so proud of its so-called national sovereignty — appears to be looking abroad for help to stay in power. During the U.S. presidential campaign, Fidesz openly hoped for Donald Trump’s return, expecting that it would deliver salvation: an end to the war in Ukraine, economic recovery, and a “peace budget.” Some even went as far as to claim that a Trump victory would bring more funding for Hungary’s healthcare system.
But almost none of this has happened. Trump has not been able to quickly bring peace to Ukraine — because it is not in Vladimir Putin’s interest — nor has he put significant pressure on Moscow. If any agreement eventually ends the war, it will likely result from Ukraine’s exhaustion rather than Trump’s diplomacy. The only consistent feature of current U.S. foreign policy is a desire to “withdraw” from the conflict, leaving Europe to shoulder more of the burden and forcing EU states to accelerate their own defense buildup as America’s role shrinks.
Meanwhile, Trump’s trade war has created a worse environment for Europe’s economy, including Hungary’s, than before. Orbán, despite his reportedly close personal ties to Trump, was unable to point to any concrete achievements in U.S.–Hungarian relations in his annual Băile Tușnad speech. The promised “deal” with Trump has not materialized, and Trump met with leaders of other regional countries before granting Orbán a meeting. Instead of the expected “peace budget,” Hungary is implementing crisis measures to cope with U.S. tariffs.
At the same time, Orbán is increasingly sidelined in the EU. His threats no longer command attention, and fellow EU leaders often seem uninterested in his posturing. Since Fidesz was forced out of the European People’s Party in 2021, Orbán’s party has focused on building ties with populist, right-wing, and far-right parties to form a broad alliance. But such a coalition is unlikely to hold together, given the deep divisions and competing interests within it. The Patriots for Europe group, along with the more extreme Europe of Sovereign Nations (ESN), remain marginal players in Brussels and have little chance of reshaping the EU. This is far from Orbán’s own definition of success, which stresses avoiding political isolation.
Hungary’s weakened international position is not just the result of failed diplomacy but also of its economic and military weakness. It is doubtful Hungary can meet the NATO target — agreed at the June summit in The Hague — of raising defense spending to 5 percent of GDP by 2030, with 3.5 percent for core military expenditures. Orbán himself has warned such spending would damage the economy. Systemic corruption further tarnishes Hungary’s image abroad.
It hardly reflects well on a country when its prime minister’s friends and family become inexplicably wealthy in just a few years. This, combined with frozen EU funds, slows economic growth and makes the Orbán model far less appealing compared to its regional peers. According to VSquare, right-wing populists from Eastern Europe — including those facing legal trouble at home — are now looking to Trump’s America for inspiration and protection, not to Hungary.
As the international environment shifts, the Orbán regime is, as always, trying to inflate its importance. The prime minister casts himself as both a Trump ally and a partner of China, presenting himself as a global powerbroker while simultaneously playing a destructive role in the EU. Domestically, this posture is reinforced by rising anti-Ukrainian rhetoric.
But it remains to be seen how long Orbán can maintain this balancing act if his system continues to weaken at home. The 2026 parliamentary election will decide Hungary’s future direction. If Fidesz manages to regroup and win, Orbán’s current course will continue. If it loses, however, recovery will be difficult — and the Orbán model could quickly become a cautionary tale of failure.
This article was published in Hungarian on Telex.hu.
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