Goulash: Fresh Poll: Whose Voters Love or Hate Russia, China, the EU, and the Trump Admin?

FRESH FROM VSQUARE

THE STORY OF TERRORGRAM: HOW ONLINE EXTREMISM LED TO A SLOVAK TERRORIST ATTACK

A new article by the Investigative Center of Ján Kuciak (ICJK) sums up the key findings from a powerful documentary by PBS FRONTLINE and ProPublica (in which ICJK journalists also appear). The film reveals how a young man known online as “Slovakbro” — already convicted of extremism — had been in close contact since at least 2019 with the attacker who carried out the 2022 shooting at the Tepláreň LGBTQ+ bar in Bratislava. The terrorist attack left Juraj Vankulič and Matúš Horváth dead, and their friend Radka Trokšiarová injured. The documentary details how the Slovak perpetrator was radicalized online by the U.S.-based Terrorgram collective, a network of far-right extremists — with Slovakbro as one of its key figures. The film aired in the U.S. on February 25 and explores how American hate speech played a role in fueling this tragedy in Central Europe. Read the whole piece here, or watch the documentary here.

HACKING DEMOCRACY: RUSSIA’S DIGITAL WAR ON GERMAN AND EUROPEAN ELECTIONS

Just before Germany’s snap elections in February, a fake video showing AfD ballots being destroyed popped up on X — as German security services later exposed, it was actually part of a Russian disinformation campaign called Storm-1516. It was part of a broader Russian cyber offensive across Europe, with campaigns like CopyCop, Doppelgänger, and Matryoshka muddying the information waters. If those code names sound intimidating, just read our latest article — it breaks down what the Russians actually did in the online sphere to try to sway voters. Full credit goes for this article to our Czech partner Investigace.cz and their brilliant data expert Josef Šlerka. (Also worth checking out: our earlier interview on Russia’s influence campaign in Germany, plus another interview where Josef unpacks the dangers TikTok poses to democracy.)

SPICY SCOOPS

There is always a lot of information that we hear and find interesting and newsworthy but don’t publish as part of our investigative reporting — and share instead in this newsletter. 

GEOPOLITICS IN THE VISEGRÁD FOUR: WHO LOVES AND HATES WHOM

A fresh survey covering the Visegrád region examines how people in Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland perceive global powers, international alliances, and security threats. The Central European Institute of Asian Studies (CEIAS), a Bratislava-based think tank, teamed up with NMS Market Research for this study by Matej Šimalčík and Filip Šebok (available here), which offers a detailed look into the shifting geopolitical preferences of Central Europeans — including attitudes toward the EU, NATO, the U.S., China, and Russia. The poll was conducted between late February and early March 2025. What makes it especially juicy for politicos is that it includes a breakdown by party preference in each country. Among the more striking findings: Slovakia has the most pro-Chinese and pro-Russian views in the region, and more people there have a negative than positive opinion of the U.S. Hinting at the future of political alliances in the country, the views of Robert Fico’s left-wing Smer party supporters are nearly indistinguishable from those of the neo-fascist Republika party. (As I’ve previously mentioned, fresh polls from Slovakia suggest Fico could only stay in power with the extreme right’s support.) A certain gold medal also goes to Smer supporters: a striking 67% of them view Russia positively — an unprecedented number in the region.

In its fondness for authoritarian powers, Hungary comes second — no surprise there. What is surprising, however, is that despite the Orbán government’s ongoing pro-Kremlin lovefest, 61% of Hungarian respondents view Russia negatively, while only 21% see it positively. When broken down by party, supporters of Orbán’s ruling Fidesz party are the most pro-Russian (42%), with the far-right Our Homeland party close behind at 40%. In contrast, supporters of the main opposition party, TISZA, reject Russia en masse — with 80% expressing negative views. Unsurprisingly, given Orbán’s bragging about his relationship with Donald Trump, the tables have turned: two-thirds of Fidesz supporters now hold a positive view of the U.S., while — also reflecting Orbán’s cues — nearly half view China positively. Meanwhile, the Czechs stand out for their euroscepticism, with only 46.5% expressing positive views of the EU. Suspicion toward China is also notable, with 59% holding negative sentiments. Among supporters of Andrej Babiš’s ANO party, 54% view the EU negatively, though 70% also dislike Russia — perhaps a reassuring data point, given that ANO is expected to win the October 2025 elections. Similar to Slovakia, ANO supporters’ views align most closely with those of the new far-right/libertarian Motorists’ party — again hinting at a possible future coalition.

Despite all the polarization in Polish politics, the country looks like a poster child of national unity compared to its neighbors when it comes to disliking Russia: 97% of the ruling Civic Coalition’s supporters view Russia negatively, and even by 75% of voters for the far-right/libertarian Confederation party — making them, relatively speaking, the most pro-Russian group in Poland. A general skepticism toward China also unites all major Polish parties, albeit less robustly, with similar party breakdowns. Views on the U.S. and the EU, however, draw clearer dividing lines: the ruling coalition’s supporters are more pro-EU, while backers of the opposition Law and Justice party and Confederation are more eurosceptic and pro-U.S. (meaning pro-Trump). An interesting bit comes from another chart on how the Visegrád countries perceive military strength: while around 80% of respondents in Slovakia, Czechia, and Hungary believe Russia has strong military capabilities, only 61% of respondents in a self-confident Poland agree — perhaps not surprising, as Poland now has the third-largest army in NATO. Check the whole study here.

CZECH–SLOVAK BROTHERHOOD AT ITS LOW POINT

“We’re not sharing anything sensitive with the Slovaks,” a Czech government official responsible for foreign and security matters told me recently in Prague, adding that “information sharing is now limited across diplomacy, intelligence, and the military.” This sentiment was echoed by other Czech officials I spoke to — most expressed not only sadness at how the two nations, once united in a single state, have drifted apart, but also concern that Slovakia and Slovaks embedded in Czech society could serve as conduits for Russian and Chinese interests, as well as the Slovak underworld. The Czech government now lumps Slovakia in with Hungary — but given the much deeper historical and cultural ties, this shift feels far more painful. According to my Czech interlocutors, Slovakia’s once-respected diplomacy has also lost credibility; even seasoned diplomats are now viewed as unreliable. “There is no substance behind what the Slovak MFA and their diplomats are saying — it’s just noise,” one official remarked. Still, referring to recent polls, several officials also voiced unease about the likely return of Andrej Babiš in six months’ time. “At least Babiš doesn’t have Russian business interests. But we’re still worried about how he might align with Orbán and Patriots for Europe,” one added.

ANDREJ BABIŠ, ORBÁN’S BACKUP PLAN AGAINST ARTICLE 7

While Babiš’s return to power is still unlikely to push the Czech Republic into the Hungarian–Slovak pro-Russian camp, several Visegrád experts and government officials I’ve spoken to recently agree that for Viktor Orbán, that’s not the main objective. “There is just one reason why Orbán invested so heavily in supporting Fico: he needs Slovakia to veto the EU’s Article 7 procedure against Hungary,” a source closely following Hungarian–Slovak relations told me, referring to the process that could strip Hungary of its EU voting rights — and with it, Orbán’s ability to block sanctions on Russia or support for Ukraine. Though still a long shot, the Article 7 solution to the EU’s “Orbán problem” has recently gained traction, especially as the incoming German coalition has reportedly vowed to hold Orbán accountable — by freezing more EU funds and possibly pushing for voting rights suspension. Slovakia would remain a key obstacle to such a move. But with growing tensions inside Fico’s coalition and mass protests on the streets, an early election — and Fico’s fall — can’t be ruled out. That’s where the Czech Republic and Babiš come into play. For Orbán, Babiš could serve as a backup veto-holder if Fico is no longer around. Multiple Czech sources told me that Orbán’s top spin doctor, Árpád Habony, and his powerful chief of staff, Minister Antal Rogán — who oversees propaganda, campaigns, and intelligence — have long been in close contact with Babiš’s inner circle. 

U.S. SANCTIONS STILL HAUNT VIKTOR ORBÁN’S CHIEF OF STAFF

In late February, the aforementioned Rogán was suddenly stripped of oversight over key areas such as IT development, procurement, and e-bureaucracy — essentially everything related to technology. Orbán offered no real explanation as to why his most powerful minister lost control over these domains, but multiple government-connected sources told me it was a consequence of Rogán being sanctioned by the U.S. under the Global Magnitsky Act for corruption during the final days of the Biden administration. Allegedly, U.S. tech companies — in compliance with the sanctions — signaled to the Hungarian government that they would be unable to supply technology, including both hardware and software, to any state institutions under Rogán’s control. A source familiar with Rogán’s U.S. sanctions explained to me that no American company or person who follows U.S. law would do business with someone on the OFAC sanctions list. If it’s unclear whether that person is involved, companies will avoid the deal entirely. Meanwhile, a Hungarian government official even revealed that the decree reassigning Rogán’s responsibilities to other ministries was drafted at the last minute. Legal experts from the Ministry of Justice, responsible for legislative matters, were summoned to work over the weekend to finalize it. This not only suggests the decision was sudden, but also that Orbán’s government doesn’t expect a Trump administration to quickly lift the sanctions against Rogán, as they previously hoped. (Rogán’s ministry didn’t reply to my request for comment.)

SECOND HELPINGS

We’d already reported but the story went on… here’s a second bite of our previous stories and scoops.

Hungary risked inciting a real crisis in the Balkans. In early March, we revealed a secret Hungarian plot to help Milorad Dodik escape — with the assistance of Orbán’s chief bodyguard and Hungary’s counter-terrorism police — in case Bosnian authorities attempted to arrest him. Here’s a quick recap: according to the plan, Hungarian special forces would have smuggled Dodik through Croatia into Hungary. In the end, the plan leaked, but there was no immediate threat of arrest to trigger the extraction anyway. Since then, I’ve learned from multiple EU government officials involved in security matters that the United States — furious over the operation — had known about the plot from the beginning and promptly informed Croatia. According to these officials, Croatian authorities were on standby and prepared to arrest both Dodik and the Hungarian counter-terrorism operatives if they attempted to cross into Croatian territory. “This would have been a major escalation in the region, potentially triggering a conflict with completely unpredictable consequences,” one official told me. When I asked a Hungarian official how angry the Americans were, the reply was simply: “Very pissed.” Meanwhile, just a few days ago, Dodik appeared in another safe haven from arrest — Moscow.

Orbán’s plans at risk by Polish financial authority. In our previous issue, I reported on how the biggest corruption scandal in contemporary Hungary — involving central bank governor György Matolcsy’s entourage enriching themselves while the central bank may have lost over €1 billion — could spill over into Poland, as most of the missing public funds ended up in Globe Trade Center S.A., a Polish company. Since then, a source familiar with the investigation into the Hungarian National Bank’s finances told me that Hungarian officials are increasingly concerned the Polish Financial Supervision Authority might intervene by launching its own probe into possible irregularities. Such a move could complicate any attempts by Orbán and Matolcsy to strike a backroom deal and bury the corruption case.

MORE FROM OUR PARTNERS

INSIDE THE RISE OF VIKTOR ORBÁN’S UNEXPECTED CHALLENGER. Direkt36’s long read uncovers how Péter Magyar’s strained relationship with a prominent minister, combined with growing frustrations, led to his dramatic break with the ruling party — and his rise as the new leader of the Hungarian opposition. (Text in Hungarian and English.)

I’M CALLING FOR YOUR MONEY. Thanks to a data leak obtained by Swedish Television (SVT), a joint investigation with FRONTSTORY.PL’s participation uncovered the inner workings of fake call center networks that scammed over 30,000 people over four years, swindling more than a quarter of a billion dollars. (Text in Polish.)

THE SON OF PUTIN’S KGB BUDDY INVESTED IN A CZECH BREWERY. HE’S ALSO A TRAINED INTELLIGENCE OFFICER. An article by Investigace.cz tells the story of how a Czech brewery was taken over by the son of oligarch and former KGB agent Vladimir Stržalkovský — himself a graduate of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service Academy. (Text in Czech.)

This was VSquare’s 40th Goulash newsletter. I hope you gobbled it up. Come back soon for another serving. 

Still hungry? Check the previous newsletter issues here! 

SZABOLCS PANYI & THE VSQUARE TEAM