#POLITICS

Goulash: GRU officers embraced in Budapest; Online hoax in Slovakia’s election

Szabolcs Panyi 2024-10-10
Szabolcs Panyi 2024-10-10

Ahoy from Prague, dear readers! This issue of Goulash comes to you fresh from the heart of Central Europe, where my Czech colleagues and I are putting future stories together (here’s a picture of us being very serious at work). 

First on today’s already well-prepared menu: a deep dive into a disinformation campaign that may have influenced Slovakia’s presidential elections. Next up, an investigation into covert Chinese activities in Hungary. And for dessert, we’re serving up a tasty spyware story straight from the Czech Republic. Too much to digest? Well, just scroll down for some spicy scoops — like on how Hungary has been embracing Russian military diplomats with ties to the GRU, letting them simmer away in plain sight. Dobrou chuť!

 Szabolcs Panyi, VSquare’s Central Europe investigative editor

The name VSquare comes from V4, an abbreviation of the Visegrád countries group. Over the years, VSquare has become the leading regional voice of investigative journalism in Central Europe. We are non-profit, independent, and driven by a passion for journalism

Support our investigations: donate today, keep our stories flowing

You can also help us spread the word by sharing this newsletter’s online version.

FRESH FROM VSQUARE

HOW FAKE ACCOUNTS SPREAD A HOAX IN SLOVAKIA’S ELECTION RACE

Earlier this year, Peter Pellegrini triumphed over pro-Western opposition candidate Ivan Korčok in Slovakia’s presidential race. But this new analysis by Karolína Kiripolská and Robert Barca for the Investigative Center of Ján Kuciak (ICJK) exposes a darker side to the contest: a hoax alleging Korčok’s cooperation with Czechoslovakia’s communist State Security Service was unleashed online, helped by a network of fake accounts. The disinformation was so effective that, according to a survey, nearly a third of those who encountered the hoax came to believe it – turning the tide of public opinion and chillingly manipulating democracy. It’s not the first time a hoax has been used to sway Slovak voters: before last year’s parliamentary elections, pro-Kremlin actors spread a deepfake audio snippet about the US rigging the election. However, the Korčok hoax seems even more impactful in retrospect. Read the full story here.

HOW CHINA’S UNITED FRONT EXTENDS ITS INFLUENCE IN HUNGARY

Viktor Orbán’s government is so concerned with civil society organizations supported by foreign countries allegedly interfering in Hungarian domestic affairs that they’re not only verbally accusing these NGOs of working for foreign intelligence agencies – they’ve also established a new state body, the Sovereignty Protection Office, to scrutinize these supposed foreign agents (in other words, to pressure journalists and anti-corruption watchdogs). But do such organizations really exist? Well, of course – just not where Orbán and his allies are looking. Kamilla Marton of Direkt36 reveals how Chinese civil society organizations in Hungary are secretly working for the Chinese Communist Party’s United Front, an influence operation linked to Chinese intelligence. Their goals? To harass and illegally police the Chinese diaspora; meddle in Hungarian real estate projects like the proposed Fudan University Budapest campus; and even prevent protests in Budapest during Xi Jinping’s visit. Read the full investigation – part of a Europe-wide international project – here.

THE MAGIC MAKER: WHY IS A CZECH BISTRO OWNER WORKING FOR INTELLEXA?

Two weeks ago, when I sent out the previous issue of this newsletter, I was in Athens at a journalism conference sharing my experience of being surveilled with Pegasus, the Israeli spyware. Right after me, Greek financial journalist Thanasis Koukakis took the stage to recount his own experience – the only difference being that his phone was hacked with a different tool: Predator. This new story by Zuzana Šotová and Paul May of Investigace.cz picks up where the Greek investigation into Koukakis’s surveillance left off, following the money from the companies behind Predator to an Israeli man living in the Czech Republic. They also managed to connect him to the bizarre case of a Czech granny who, at least on paper, is listed as the director of Israeli spyware company Cytrox. Read the full investigation here.

Our team is really on fire! Tadeusz Michrowski from FRONTSTORY / VSquare is a finalist for the European Journalism Centre’s 2024 Climate Journalism Award in the Storytelling & Solutions category. His shortlisted project, Catch 22 on the Baltic: The Twilight of Poland’s Coastal Fishermen, investigates the decline of Poland’s coastal fishing industry. In case you missed it, you can read this excellent article here.

SPICY SCOOPS

There is always a lot of information that we hear and find interesting and newsworthy but don’t publish as part of our investigative reporting — and share instead in this newsletter. 

HUNGARY’S SENIOR ARMY LEADER EMBRACES RUSSIA’S GRU-LINKED MILITARY ATTACHÉ

On the evening of September 26, 2024, at the Vígadó Concert Hall on the Pest side of the Danube riverbank, Lieutenant General Ferenc Kajári, deputy chief of the Hungarian General Staff, engaged in a lengthy conversation with Colonel Oleg Smirnov, the military and air attaché of the Russian Federation, during a reception hosted by the People’s Republic of China. In the gilded, chandelier-lit hall of the Vigadó, hundreds of guests, including numerous Hungarian government officials, businessmen, and foreign diplomats, were gathered to celebrate the 75th anniversary of the establishment of the People’s Republic of China and the commencement of diplomatic relations between China and Hungary. It was in this crowd that the second-in-command of the Hungarian Armed Forces conversed with the Russian military attaché with remarkable ease – much to the astonishment of several attendees, as well as diplomats who heard about the scene from those present, according to my sources familiar with the incident. Since Russia attacked Ukraine in 2022, representatives of the Russian army have been regarded as unacceptable within the Western alliance, and protocol and diplomatic contact with them has nearly ceased.

“It caused confusion among NATO allies, as such communication is considered mauvais ton (bad, unacceptable behavior) in their countries,” said one source familiar with the incident. When I described the scene above to an official working at the NATO headquarters in Brussels, they responded, “In general, we find such behavior odd and unwelcome. Plus, with the Russian military attaché of all people? That person is 100 percent GRU!” The NATO official was referring to the fact that Russian military attachés have, as a rule, also been working for the GRU, the Russian military intelligence service, since the Soviet era. It is unclear what topics Lieutenant General Kajári and Colonel Smirnov discussed, or whether they spoke about anything other than farewells and polite well-wishes (as Smirnov had just concluded his mission in Hungary). However, this reception may have been the first opportunity for the leadership of the Hungarian Armed Forces to personally convey their thoughts regarding comments made by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s political director Balázs Orbán (no relation) to the Russian military. The remarks made headlines in the international press a few hours earlier that day.

What were those comments? “Every country has the right to decide its own destiny for itself,” Balázs Orbán said on a podcast, adding, “But based on 1956, we wouldn’t have done what President Zelenskyy did two and a half years ago, because that was irresponsible.” His suggestion that Hungary – unlike Ukraine – wouldn’t defend itself against a Russian invasion caused a significant political scandal, and Balázs Orbán was forced to apologize the next day after Prime Minister Orbán publicly stated that his subordinate had made a mistake. However, it remains unclear whether anyone from the Hungarian government communicated directly with the Russians to inform them that they are not actually welcome to invade – or whether the deputy chief of the Hungarian General Staff took the opportunity to do so at the Chinese reception. It would be quite newsworthy if he did – but even more so if he didn’t. (I sent detailed questions to Hungary’s Ministry of Defense regarding the protocol-breaking conversation but have received no reply.)

BUDAPEST STARTS LOOKING LIKE THE REGIONAL GRU HEADQUARTERS

But wait… What are Russian military attachés doing in Budapest in the first place? After Russia’s full-scale invasion, EU and NATO allies expelled hundreds of Russian diplomats for espionage, and GRU-linked Russian military attachés and their deputies were among the first to become personae non grata. I quickly checked the lists of accredited diplomats in Visegrád countries (with the help of my colleagues Anna Gielewska and Tamara Kaňuchová) and found that Hungary is the only country in the region that still hosts a Russian military attaché. The total number of Russian diplomats in Hungary (45 in Budapest, Szeged and Debrecen) is almost as high as those in the Czech Republic (12), Poland (12 in Warsaw and 11 in other cities), and Slovakia (14) combined. Moreover, the Hungarian foreign ministry’s diplomatic database – last refreshed on September 27 – lists five Russian military diplomats in Budapest: one military and defense attaché, two military and air attachés, and two of their deputies. This suggests that both those who officially finished their posting – like the above mentioned Colonel Smirnov – and their incoming replacements still enjoy diplomatic immunity. According to experienced former Hungarian counterintelligence sources, these Russian officers – some of whom spent two or three previous tours in Budapest – are well-known to local security agencies and all work for the GRU.

No wonder, then, that Russia’s military intelligence is extremely active in Hungary. In the 2010s, members of the Russian military attaché’s office from Budapest trained and helped arm a pro-Russian neo-Nazi paramilitary organization, the Hungarian National Front, which was disbanded after its leader, István Győrkös, killed a police officer with a semi-automatic rifle in 2016. The GRU was also partially behind the hacking of the IT systems of the Hungarian foreign ministry. However, the real risk posed by GRU officers operating freely from Hungary is directed at other countries in the region. “Russians spying on us don’t do it from the Czech Republic, but mostly from Vienna and, to a lesser extent, from Budapest,” a Czech government official dealing with Russia and security issues told me in Prague. Perhaps, then, it’s worth taking a look at the new Russian military attaché in Budapest, replacing Smirnov: Alexey Zarudnev, who has previously completed two tours at the Russian embassy in Budapest as a deputy military attaché. He was in this position in October 2014, when two agents from the GRU’s 29155 unit, which specializes in foreign assassinations, made a stopover at the Russian Embassy in Budapest on their way to the Czech Republic. After whatever they did during their stop in Hungary, they subsequently blew up ammunition depots in Vrbětice, killing two people in the attack. I have a feeling that Zarudnev could share interesting details about that to the Hungarian Armed Forces’ leadership if they were to chit-chat with him as well.

HUNGARIAN DIPLOMACY MEDDLES IN SLOVAK POLITICS, AND FAILS

On September 28, representatives of the Hungarian minority party in Slovakia (Magyar Szövetség / Maďarská Aliancia) elected a new chairman after a string of electoral defeats. In the  Slovak parliamentary election of 2023, the party fell short of making it into the Slovak parliament, securing just 4.39 percent of the votes (in Slovakia, a party needs 5 percent to get into parliament). Many ethnic Hungarian voters defected to support Robert Fico’s Smer party at the instruction of Viktor Orbán’s government and its propaganda media. The election of the new chairman was also not without interference from the so-called Motherland: As first reported by Napunk/Denník N, the Hungarian Embassy in Bratislava “sent signals” to delegates to elect one particular candidate, Péter Pandy, as chairman. According to my sources in Slovakia who closely followed the race for the ethnic Hungarian party’s chairmanship, the interference from Hungary into the party convention in Slovakia was quite direct.

In addition to a diplomat from the Hungarian Embassy in Bratislava, two local politicians from the Hungarian city of Budaörs, one of them a former deputy mayor from Orbán’s Fidesz party, were present at the party convention. Their presence was also proved by photos taken at the scene, which were shared with me. Throughout the convention, these Fidesz politicians tried to sway delegates to vote in favor of Pandy. They were also allegedly reporting via phone to Csaba Balogh, Hungary’s ambassador to Slovakia. The attempt failed, and delegates eventually elected a different candidate, László Gubík. I asked the Hungarian government if they indeed instructed their diplomats to interfere with the internal election process of a Slovak party – since the foreign ministry is extremely sensitive about the topic of foreign meddling in domestic politics – but received no reply.

Got a nice scoop to include in our Goulash newsletter? Can’t wait to hear it! Send it to me at [email protected]

SECOND HELPINGS

We’d already reported but the story went on… here’s a second bite of our previous stories and scoops.

Spain’s Vox admits receiving loans from an Orbán-linked bank. That was fast: after I wrote in my previous Goulash newsletter that Hungary’s MBH Bank is the only financial institution that could have financed the 2023 campaign of the Spanish far-right Vox party – and my colleague Daniel Iriarte reported this for El Confidencial, which was then quoted by the rest of the Spanish media – Vox quickly admitted the MBH Bank as the source of their loans. Meanwhile, the Hungarian government claims it had no knowledge of the loan by a bank that’s partly owned by themselves and partly by Prime Minister Orbán’s childhood friend. My sources from the world of Hungarian finance tell me that MBH’s senior bank management is now increasingly worried about receiving orders to finance other European Orbán allies, which would potentially undermine the bank’s international credibility even more.

Orbán aide’s promotion postponed indefinitely. Some scoops don’t age well, I have to admit – but who could have foreseen the self-inflicted scandal of Balázs Orbán, the Hungarian PM’s political director? His chances of getting promoted to Hungarian foreign minister, which I previously wrote about, were quite good throughout the summer – up until his remarks, mentioned above, about letting Russia invade Hungary. My reliable government–connected sources now tell me that they believe his gaffe eventually proved to Viktor Orbán that he’s simply not up for the job, and he’s quickly gone from being seen as an asset to a liability.

If you like our scoops and stories, here are some more articles from our partners!

MORE FROM OUR PARTNERS

LEARNED HELPLESSNESS: BALÁZS ORBÁN, UKRAINE AND HUNGARIAN HISTORICAL MEMORY. Let me recommend one more article about the Balázs Orbán scandal – as Atlatszo.hu’s Zalán Zubor argues in his commentary, Orbán was actually just “saying the quiet part out loud.” (Text in English and Hungarian.)

ORBÁN AND THE ECONOMY (PART I & II). My colleagues at Direkt36 – András Szabó, Patrik Galavits and András Pethő – have spent months interviewing 50 well-connected sources to reveal the key players and issues behind the economic downward spiral of Viktor Orbán’s rule. (Texts in English and Hungarian.)

FIRM OF BUSINESSMAN LINKED TO OLIGARCH BÖDÖR WINS MILLION-EUROS TENDER TO RENOVATE GOVERNMENT OFFICE. ICJK.sk and the Stop Corruption Foundation’s joint investigation found that, while Robert Fico’s government is imposing austerity measures, a construction company close to a well-known oligarch’s circle has won, alone or in consortia, public contracts worth a total of about 30 million euros. (Text in Slovak.)

ALIENS, VOLCANOES AND THE WIND FROM MOSCOW. FRONTSTORY.PL’s article is part of an international investigation into the cult-like Creative Society Movement, which spreads climate disinformation, pseudoscience, and conspiracy theories — and has an alarming number of followers. (Text in Polish.)

THE ALL PEOPLE’S PROJECT TO SAVE THE PLANET. THE ALLATRA MOVEMENT IS ACTIVE IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC, BUT SECURITY SERVICES HAVE INTERVENED AGAINST IT IN UKRAINE. Investigate.cz’s article focuses on the Czech angle of the same movement – which already has hundreds of members in the country, and has been active during anti-government protests as well. (Text in Czech.)

This was VSquare’s 28th Goulash newsletter. I hope you gobbled it up. Come back soon for another serving. 

Still hungry? Check the previous newsletter issues here! 

SZABOLCS PANYI & THE VSQUARE TEAM

Subscribe to Goulash, our original VSquare newsletter that delivers the best investigative journalism from Central Europe straight to your inbox!


By filling in the data and subscribing to the Newsletter, you consent to the sending of the “Goulash Newsletter” to the e-mail address provided. The data provided in the form will not be used for any other purpose.



Szabolcs Panyi

VSquare’s Budapest-based lead investigative editor in charge of Central European investigations, Szabolcs Panyi is also a Hungarian investigative journalist at Direkt36. He covers national security, foreign policy, and Russian and Chinese influence. He was a European Press Prize finalist in 2018 and 2021.