Goulash: Orbán’s Spies in Brussels; Czech and Moldova Elections in the Spotlight

FRESH FROM VSQUARE

INSIDE THE FALL OF VIKTOR ORBÁN’S SECRET BRUSSELS SPY NETWORK

It seems we’ve just uncovered the first known case in recent memory of an EU member state spying on EU institutions using the same methods typically employed by Russia or China. Well, almost the same methods— Hungary’s secret espionage operations in Brussels during the 2010s were apparently far less sophisticated, as the spy ring operating from Hungary’s Permanent Representation to the EU was eventually exposed. The fallout is significant — former Hungarian ambassador and current EU Commissioner Olivér Várhelyi is now in hot water, facing an internal probe by the European Commission. This story was a collaboration between Lars Bové (De Tijd), Hannes Munzinger and Elisa Simantke (Paper Trail Media); and myself, originally for Direkt36. Here’s the full story on VSquare. (In case you missed it, check out the prequel — about how Hungary’s foreign intelligence service surveilled EU anti-fraud investigators while they were probing Viktor Orbán’s son-in-law’s company.)

SPONSORED HATE: HOW POLITICIANS PAID FOR META ADS TO ATTACK JOURNALISTS

Politicians across Central Europe are turning social media into a weapon. In Slovakia, the hate is frequently sponsored by politicians and parties in government — with Hungary not far behind — as paid social media ads attack journalists, activists, and NGOs. In Czechia, extremists join the fray, while in Poland such ads often target migrants instead. Meanwhile, Meta and Google have been profiting from this #SponsoredHate (the name of our project) and haven’t even bothered to explain themselves. This cross-border investigation was led by Karin Kőváry Sólymos from the Investigative Center of Ján Kuciak (ICJK). You can read the local findings in the Slovak, Hungarian, Czech and Polish versions — and, of course, can find a regional overview in English on VSquare with some amazing infographics.

24/7 RUSSIAN PROPAGANDA BLITZ HIT MOLDOVA BEFORE THE ELECTIONS

Before Moldova’s parliamentary election on September 28, 2025, citizens had faced months — if not years — of Kremlin-aligned and often Kremlin-financed foreign influence campaigns. Tamara Kaňuchová’s analysis, quoting some of the best experts on the topic, reveals the scale of Russia’s massive propaganda offensive in the small country, uncovering shocking details: 134 pro-Russian activists managed 30 Telegram channels, receiving €2.8 million by mid-2025 to influence the vote. Meanwhile, 9,900 AI-generated TikTok videos reached over 93 million views — in a country of fewer than 3 million people. Read the analysis here.

SPICY SCOOPS

There is always a lot of information that we hear and find interesting and newsworthy but don’t publish as part of our investigative reporting — and share instead in this newsletter. 

PRO-KREMLIN, PRO-IRANIAN SCHOLAR NOW IN CHARGE AT ORBÁN’S PET UNIVERSITY

A recurring character in this newsletter, the Mathias Corvinus Collegium (MCC), is an Orbán government–funded institution functioning as a mix of think tank and foreign lobbying platform — mostly dedicated to inviting, dining, and putting Western European and U.S. conservative and far-right figures on the payroll. Ironically, that’s why a recent hire has raised eyebrows even inside the institution, according to my MCC-linked sources. Over the summer, MCC appointed Misa Djurković, a Serbian scholar, as head of its Center for Geopolitics. His record includes appearances at high-profile events in Iran and the pro-Kremlin Valdai Club (where Vladimir Putin gives a regular speech and answers club members’ questions), as well as personal and professional ties to individuals linked to the 2016 Montenegrin coup attempt organized by Russia’s GRU military intelligence alongside local actors.

Djurković previously advised Andrija Mandić, leader of the pro-Russian New Serb Democracy, who was indicted in the coup case — sentenced to five years in prison but later acquitted. In his writings, Djurković consistently promotes Kremlin narratives and has publicly defended the alleged coup plotters. (The Montenegrin coup also has a Polish connection: Edvard Shishmakov, a GRU operative involved in the plot, had previously served as deputy military attaché in Poland, where he was running a Russian spy network in Warsaw.) However, my sources say it’s primarily Djurković’s networking with Iranian officials and visits to the country that MCC insiders view as deeply problematic. This is because the institution and its de facto leader, Balázs Orbán (no relation to the prime minister), are actively courting U.S. conservatives and MAGA influencers, many of whom hold strongly hawkish views on Iran. “We believe that the head of the Geopolitical Workshop should possess precisely such diverse experience, global network of connections, and comprehensive insight as Misa Djurković does. His arrival did not lead to any internal tensions; his selection was carried out by our academic-professional staff,” MCC replied to my request for comment.

POLISH TOP OFFICIALS INVESTIGATED IN CORRUPTION AND SPYWARE CASES TO REUNITE IN BUDAPEST

The same MCC that promotes pro-Kremlin figures is now hosting an event with high-profile Polish guests. The embattled former minister of justice from the Law and Justice government, Zbigniew Ziobro, is set to speak at the screening of a Polish right-wing propaganda film titled Taking Over on October 27, alongside Viktor Orbán’s minister in charge of the Prime Minister’s Office, Gergely Gulyás. However, my MCC-linked sources tell me it’s highly likely that Ziobro’s former deputy, Marcin Romanowski — who fled an arrest warrant in Poland and was granted asylum by Orbán — will also be present, reuniting in public with his former boss. (More on the real reasons why Romanowski may have been evacuated to Hungary here, and on the shady report behind Orbán’s asylum decision here.)

For context: both are accused in multiple corruption cases, mostly related to defrauding the so-called Justice Fund, allegedly diverting money meant for crime prevention and crime victims to finance party loyalists. Moreover, both are implicated in Poland’s Pegasus spyware investigation, for which Ziobro may face separate criminal charges. When I asked MCC why they’re giving Ziobro a platform, they replied that Donald Tusk’s government is “conducting a political witch hunt against former leading politicians and government figures of Law and Justice” and the film, to the screening of which “we have invited Minister Zbigniew Ziobro, presents exactly these legal violations and political retributions”. Meanwhile, they didn’t reply to my question about Romanowski’s participation. (My bad, I actually forgot to ask whether Djurković might also join them straight from the Valdai Club.)

FIRST HINTS AT PÉTER MAGYAR’S POSSIBLE ENERGY AND FOREIGN POLICY TEAM

Meanwhile in Hungary, the countdown to the April 2026 election has begun — with less than six months to go. A recent survey by a reliable pollster shows opposition leader Péter Magyar’s TISZA party leading Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz 53–35, an 18-point gap. And there are now more signs of the potential foreign policy direction of a future TISZA government. This week, two of Magyar’s meetings drew analysts’ attention — one with István Kapitány, recently retired global vice-president of Shell, likely Hungary’s most successful business executive on a global scale, and another with Anita Orbán (no relation to the PM), a senior Vodafone executive and former energy envoy in Viktor Orbán’s governments in the early 2010s.

A staunch transatlanticist, Anita Orbán worked to diversify Hungary’s energy supplies away from Russia before joining the LNG sector. For bigger research, I recently read her PhD thesis — published as a book in the late 2000s — on Russian energy imperialism, an excellent and still-relevant analysis. While any speculation about future roles remains just that, TISZA confirmed that it has sought their advice and input—and, by turning to accomplished professionals outside the usual Hungarian political circles, Magyar is signaling a clear shift in approach. Analysts and sources close to TISZA told me these are further signs that Péter Magyar envisions a more technocratic government, likely relying on those with international experience and with few ties to domestic politics.

BREWING IN THE BOTTOM — EXCLUSIVE ANALYSIS

VSquare’s Tamara Kaňuchová spoke with Pavel Havlíček (Association for International Affairs in Prague, AMO) about the outcome of the Czech elections.

CZECH ELECTION AFTERMATH, EXPLAINED. Following the October 3–4 Czech parliamentary elections, Andrej Babiš and his ANO movement (winning 34.51% of the votes) are forming a coalition government with the far-right/libertarian Motorists (6.77%) and the far-right SPD (7.78%) parties. The 16-member cabinet will include eight ANO ministers besides the PM, most probably four ministries for Motorists — including foreign affairs — and three for SPD, which will also claim the defense ministry and the post of Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies, likely to be filled by SPD leader Tomio Okamura. The incumbent center-right SPOLU alliance led by Petr Fiala only won 23.36%, forming the new opposition along with STAN (11,23%) and Pirates (8.97%), while the far-left, pro-Russian Stačilo party failed to reach parliament with 4.3% (as we predicted in our previous Goulash newsletter). Babiš said ministerial appointments will take about a month as coalition talks continue. The new parliament convenes on November 3.

Among candidates, controversial influencer-turned-MEP Filip Turek (check out our earlier investigation into his popularity here) was briefly floated for foreign affairs, before Deník N revealed his earlier social media posts mocking the Holocaust, denying women’s suffrage, and expressing full-blown racism — likely ending his chances. For minister of defense, possible candidates include Jaromír Zůna (former deputy chief of staff of the Czech army) and Jiří Hynek (Defense Industry Association). “ANO grew stronger, partly because it managed to take over some of the support for anti-establishment parties… The data shows a strong negative correlation: where ANO grew, the anti-establishment bloc fell,” stated an analysis from PAQ Research, referring to Motorists, SPD and Stačilo as anti-establishment. “It reminded me of Slovakia, it’s kind of a revolt against the elite, the sitting government, but the level of it surprised even Babiš. Besides his own base, he also managed to persuade voters that it’s not a good idea to go for the extreme sides of the spectrum,” Pavel Havlíček told us.

Looking at what’s ahead during the coalition talks, according to Babiš, the support for Ukraine will likely take place in the form of private business and export of weapons instead of the public-funded Czech ammunition initiative that he criticized during the campaign. “Babiš will probably follow the commercial interest, and as long as he understands how much these companies are paying to the state budget, it will just continue very smoothly,” Havlíček told us. As for predictions on foreign policy, Babiš made sure to pretty much stay out of it, excluding both ministries of foreign affairs and defense from his selection of ministries for ANO. “Babiš used to have some level of business involvement with the Chinese market, but he was pushed out, so he burned his fingers. That’s something that we know from before, but still holds, so he’s definitely not pro-China, and I would also say, not pro-Russia. He’s just pro-Babiš,” Havlíček added.

MORE FROM OUR PARTNERS

If you like our scoops and stories, here are some more articles from our partners!

RESIDENTS ACHIEVE VICTORY AGAINST POLLUTING BATTERY FACTORY AFTER YEARS OF LITIGATION. Átlátszó reports on locals’ fight against Samsung’s polluting battery factory north of Budapest, where a court ruling has annulled the plant’s environmental permit. (Text in Hungarian and English.)

INVESTIGACE.CZ’S INTERVIEW SERIES WITH GAZANS. Our Czech partners are publishing a series of interviews with people who lived in Gaza during the war and managed to leave, as well as with those who still live there. Three parts (recorded either in Egypt or online) have already been published in Czech — here, here, and here.

DESSERT AND FURTHER READINGS

For those still hungry for more, we’re finishing today’s menu with a couple of recommendations from our friends and colleagues.

HOW ORBÁN’S ANTI-UKRAINE CRUSADE FUELS HUNGARY’S ELECTION WAR MACHINE. Erik Uszkiewicz from the Hungarian Europe Society has a great analysis on Visegrád Insight on how “anti-Ukraine sentiment and war threats are exploited for political gain in Hungary”.

BIG OIL’S RETREAT FROM RENEWABLES. “Disappointed but not surprised: after a short wave of renewable investments, fossil fuel companies are reverting to business as usual,” writes Tamara Kaňuchová for the European Correspondent. 

DAYS UNTIL THE HUNGARIAN ELECTIONS. Denník N’s Veronika Munk — founder and former editor-in-chief of the Hungarian news site Telex.hu — has launched an English-language newsletter on Substack on the Hungarian election campaign, together with Denník N/Napunk’s Zoltán Szalay. It’s a great source of information for international readers on the Orbán vs. Magyar battle.

ONE AMSTERDAM COURT COULD DECIDE ON THE FUTURE OF SERBIA’S FREE PRESS. Serbia’s last independent TV channel, N1, fears for its future as its parent company, United Group, seems to be moving closer to President Aleksandar Vučić’s government. United Group’s ousted founder, Dragan Šolak, is asking an Amsterdam court to suspend the new CEO — who was caught on tape admitting he fired a director at Vučić’s request. Follow the Money explains the story in detail.

This was VSquare’s 51st Goulash newsletter. I hope you gobbled it up. Come back soon for another serving. 

Still hungry? Check the previous newsletter issues here! 

SZABOLCS PANYI & THE VSQUARE TEAM