Goulash: Szijjártó’s Wagner Worry; Orbán’s Legal Trouble; Russian Logistics Network in Poland

FRESH FROM VSQUARE

AS WAGNER MARCHED TOWARD MOSCOW, SZIJJÁRTÓ OFFERED HELP. LAVROV LAUGHED

Three years ago this week, as Yevgeny Prigozhin’s Wagner mercenaries rolled toward Moscow, Hungary’s then-foreign minister Péter Szijjártó picked up the phone — not to check on Ukraine, not to coordinate with EU partners, but to ask his friend Sergey Lavrov if he was okay and to offer “personal” help. Lavrov laughed and politely declined. This previously unpublished transcript from our Kremlin Hotline investigation captures the nature of this relationship in full: a NATO foreign minister anxiously checking in with the Kremlin during an attempted armed rebellion against the Russian state. Read it here.

WHY IS POLAND HOSTING A RUSSIAN-LINKED LOGISTICS NETWORK?

A snowstorm, a fatal truck crash near Stockholm, and a Polish-plated lorry hauling a Kazakh trailer with a Belarusian logo — that’s where our colleagues at FRONTSTORY.pl, SVT, Buro Media, and Paper Trail Media started pulling the thread. What they uncovered is a sprawling network of Polish-registered transport companies quietly funneling cargo between the EU, Belarus, and Russia for the benefit of Russian millionaire Vasily Smetanin and his Sberbank-linked partner. Four years into sanctions, the trucks keep rolling — and Polish authorities keep shrugging. Check it out here.

SPICY SCOOPS

There is always a lot of information that we hear and find interesting and newsworthy but don’t publish as part of our investigative reporting — and share instead in this newsletter.

ORBÁN’S DIRTY RAID UNDER INVESTIGATION, LEGAL TROUBLES LOOM FOR THE FORMER PM

Some readers will remember my story, titled Orbán’s Dirty Raid: Inside Hungary’s Hijacking of Ukraine’s Bank Convoy, into the March 5 Hungarian operation that intercepted a Ukrainian bank convoy in Hungary and seized cash and gold plus detained its Ukrainian crew. In recent weeks and days, Hungarian authorities — now freed up from Orbán’s control — and media have effectively confirmed what we reported: the raid, the detention of the Ukrainian bank employees, and the seizure were unlawful and were a desperate campaign stunt  — and the orders reportedly came from the very top. Hungarian news site Telex wrote that Viktor Orbán personally directed the operation, down to telling authorities when the raid should take place. The tax authority’s own internal review, meanwhile, uncovered unlawful conduct during the procedure, including the interrogation of the Ukrainian bank employees.

Multiple sources familiar with the Hungarian prosecution’s investigation, as well as a document news site 444 has obtained, indicate that prosecutors have identified the individuals who gave the orders: state secretary for intelligence services Örs Farkas, whose role was first revealed in our VSquare story; the deputy chief of Hungary’s tax office, Tamás Demeter; Orbán’s former bodyguard and head of the TEK counterterrorism unit, János Hajdú; and Orbán himself. Prosecutors consider them the potential main suspects of offences including unlawful detention and abuse of office. In reality, however, only two of them may have to really worry. The central figure of the investigation is expected to be Hajdú, who has a history of carrying out extremely risky operations on behalf of Orbán — such as plans to extract Milorad Dodik from Banja Luka, per our previous investigation.

According to my sources familiar with details of the investigation, while Hajdú issued direct orders and personally participated on the ground during the rough and completely illegal detention and interrogation of the Ukrainians, those around him believed he was on the phone with, and getting instructions from, someone high-up. As prosecutors close in, one source told me, it’s Hajdú who will have to choose: take the fall and accept whatever punishment comes with it, or name his long-time boss who gave him the orders for and during the operation. Another well-informed source added that prosecutors are also looking at their own superior — Hungary’s Orbán-appointed chief prosecutor — who, they believe, also played a role in facilitating the illegal raid. Hungarian prosecutors declined to comment at this stage. Orbán’s office did not reply, but the former PM previously claimed he didn’t do anything illegal.

HUNGARY WON’T HARBOR INTERNATIONALLY WANTED CRIMINALS — WHAT ABOUT MOL’S CEO?

“Hungary will not harbor internationally wanted criminals,” Péter Magyar said again and again during the election campaign — and has repeated since taking office. So far, however, his government didn’t deliver on that pledge. It hasn’t had to. Mostly, that’s because former Polish Justice Minister Zbigniew Ziobro and his deputy Marcin Romanowski, the most famous of the fugitives who fled to Hungary under Orbán’s protection, instantly left after Magyar took office. Then there is Nikola Gruevski, the fugitive former North Macedonian prime minister who, as Goulash readers will recall, was quietly handed Hungarian citizenship under the Orbán government — whose whereabouts are unknown, but who was still in Hungary a few weeks ago. 

However, technically, there is a fourth name on that list, and it is the one nobody in Budapest seems eager to mention. According to fresh confirmation from the Croatian Ministry of Justice to my colleague Ana Mlinaric of RTL Croatia, both the Croatian arrest warrant and the European Arrest Warrant (based on the Croatian) against MOL chief executive Zsolt Hernádi remain in force. The Croatian judiciary convicted Hernádi in absentia of bribing former Croatian Prime Minister Ivo Sanader to secure management rights over the Croatian oil company INA — a case that has dragged on through Croatian and Hungarian courts for more than a decade. In Hungary, a final ruling issued by the Budapest-Capital Regional Court on March 18 refused to recognize the Croatian convictions — but the arrest warrant itself stands. While some even around the ruling Tisza party contest Hernádi’s guilt in this particular case, technically, again, he is wanted internationally.

At the same time, multiple government-connected sources argue the regime change Magyar promised cannot be credibly delivered while Hernádi continues to run one of Hungary’s largest companies. While Magyar has framed his government as a clean break from both the Orbán era and the Socialist years that preceded it, Hernádi has been president-CEO of MOL through all of them, continuously since 2001, becoming an integral part of Orbán’s inner circle. As a former MOL insider put it to me, the outstanding warrant has long been a useful instrument of political control: Hernádi’s freedom depended on the goodwill of Orbán, and the same logic — technically — now applies to Magyar. It’s hard to see, though, how such a compromised figure can remain in place if the new government’s promise of a clean break is to mean anything at all. Being forced to leave MOL and being extradited to Croatia are two separate things, of course.

I’ve sent questions to the Prime Minister’s Office and to MOL asking whether Hernádi’s arrest warrant and possible extradition have been discussed inside the new Hungarian government, and whether the Magyar government considers Hernádi — by the letter of the European warrant — an internationally wanted criminal. I’ve also asked if they support Hernádi staying on as CEO and president of MOL. No answers yet.

BREWING IN THE BOTTOM

VSquare’s Tamara Kaňuchová explains how the Czech government’s move against the public media’s independence has triggered protests.

Czech public broadcasters went on a warning strike this week. For 24 hours, Czech Television (Česká televize) and Czech Radio altered their regular programming to protest a proposal recently approved by the Babiš government. If finally adopted, the new law would abolish the license-fee model that currently finances public broadcasters and cut their planned state funding by 15 percent, effectively returning their budgets to 2008 levels. Employees are calling for the independence of public media to be protected from political and other forms of pressure. They fear that if concession fees are abolished and broadcasters become fully dependent on government funding, the result will be layoffs and cuts to programming. Under the proposed budget, Czech Television may no longer be able to meet its legally mandated quota for regional coverage.

On Monday, June 22, Czech Television’s broadcasts began one minute late. Hosts across its programming wore black, and its social media accounts posted only sparingly, each time including a message about their strike. Czech Radio’s main, regional, and digital stations joined together several times throughout the day, airing explanations of the strike as well as a minute of silence. Opposition politicians and President Petr Pavel have warned that the Czech Republic is following the playbook used in Slovakia and Viktor Orbán’s Hungary. “The Slovak and Hungarian scenarios resonate strongly in the Czech context. And while critics of these changes point primarily to the Slovak scenario, the Czech governing majority rejects that comparison as unfair, claiming instead that it is taking inspiration from the Nordic countries,” said Pavol Szalai, director of the Prague bureau of Reporters Without Borders.

“But first, the only minister of a foreign country with whom the Czech culture minister discussed this issue in an official meeting was the Slovak culture minister — and he clearly described that meeting as inspiring. And second, when we offered the government and members of parliament a meeting with our Slovak expert, who had come to Prague specifically to discuss how cultural institutions are run and funded in the Nordic countries, the government and the governing majority showed no interest in that expertise,” Szalai said. He pointed to another key difference: the European Media Freedom Act, which was not yet available when Slovakia overhauled its public broadcaster. “In response to our appeal as Reporters Without Borders, the European Commission has agreed to review the Czech legislation, even before its adoption, specifically in light of this binding European law,” he said.

Meanwhile, what began as a 24-hour warning strike, may continue. “In the case of Czech Radio, this was the first strike since 1990. In the case of Czech Television, the last strike was only in 2025. So they are really mobilized on an unprecedented scale,” Szalai said. “I think this was a kind of test, and the strike could happen again — and it could be even stronger. As for the government, we do not know exactly when Parliament will debate the bill. It could happen in July or September. I think it will really depend on public pressure and on any steps the European Commission may take. In any case, we are calling for common sense to return to this debate. Given the ruling majority’s political attacks on the media, and the fact that these changes are not based on any expert assessment, we see this as an attempt to undermine media independence,” Szalai said.

MORE FROM OUR PARTNERS

If you like our scoops and stories, here are some more articles from our partners!

RUSSIA’S FSB HAS STARTED ARRESTING ST. PETERSBURG MOBSTERS FROM PUTIN’S INNER CIRCLE. Investigate.cz’s Pavla Holcová reports that the FSB has detained Ilya Traber — the “Antikvar,” a 1990s St. Petersburg crime boss who knew Putin from his city hall days and once controlled the port, the fuel terminals, and the Pulkovo aviation refuelling business — over the 2020 contract killing, while another aging godfather, Gennady Petrov, is facing house searches. (Text in Czech.)

DEFENSE MINISTRY ORDERED PILOT TRAINING WORTH OVER €1 MILLION WITHOUT A TENDER — FROM A COMPANY WITH NEITHER A SIMULATOR NOR A TRAINING LICENCE. ICJK reveals that Robert Kaliňák’s Slovak defense ministry spent €1.2 million for pilot-training orders for its two no-bid Bombardier Global 5000 luxury jets in a rather questionable way. (Text in Slovak.)

THE REMARKABLE STORY OF PÉTER SZIJJÁRTÓ’S BEST FRIEND AND THE BILLIONS OF PUBLIC FUNDS. Direkt36 traces how Szilárd Benkő — Péter Szijjártó’s chief of staff turned construction entrepreneur and self-described “best friend of 30 years” — landed billions in state-backed contracts at the BMW and CATL plants in Debrecen, and even bagged a slice of a water treatment project in Rwanda that Szijjártó personally negotiated with his Rwandan counterpart. (Text in English and Hungarian.)

AS STATE BILLIONS HAVE DRIED UP, FIDESZ’S MEDIA EMPIRE IS SHRINKING. With state advertising revenues collapsing after Orbán’s defeat, Átlátszó explains how mass layoffs are sweeping through the pro-government media universe. (Text in English and Hungarian.)

THE BOY I RAISED — MOURNING AND REMEMBRANCE OF BENJAMIN ASHER IN UKRAINE. Átlátszó’s documentary follows Nathan Asher, a Canadian father, as he travels back to Ukraine to visit the grave of his son Benjamin, the first Hungarian volunteer to be killed fighting in the Ukrainian armed forces since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion. (Text in English and Hungarian.)

DESSERT AND FURTHER READINGS

For those still hungry for more, we’re finishing today’s menu with a couple of recommendations from our friends and colleagues.

NEW HUNGARIAN PM MAGYAR “RELAUNCHES” VISEGRÁD GROUP WITH POLAND, SLOVAKIA AND CZECH REPUBLIC. Notes from Poland covers the first V4 summit in over two years, hosted by Péter Magyar at Gödöllő Palace, Hungary, where Donald Tusk, Robert Fico and Andrej Babiš agreed to coordinate ahead of EU Council meetings and floated a high-speed rail line linking the four capitals — with Russian energy dependence and Ukraine policy still standing as the elephants in the room.

FALL AND IMPUNITY: MEČIAR’S FATE COULD SERVE AS A WARNING FOR ORBÁN AND HUNGARY. My latest Hungarian-language Substack essay digs into the post-1998 career of Vladimír Mečiar — Slovakia’s Orbán-before-Orbán — and what his failed comebacks, amnesty maneuvers, and slow fade into irrelevance might tell us about what to expect from Hungary’s defeated former prime minister. Follow my Substack here.

EU CITIZEN’S COMPANY SENT SANCTIONED EQUIPMENT TO RUSSIAN DEFENSE FIRMS. Trade data dug up by Kyiv Independent and IrpiMedia for OCCRP shows that Redwing Metal, a Turkey-based outfit co-owned by a Dutch national, shipped over $5 million in Italian, German, Spanish and Czech metalworking machinery to two Rostec-linked Russian defense plants making components for Kh-101 cruise missiles and combat aircraft.

NOT SO STRANGE BEDFELLOWS: AN ASPIRING MAGA INFLUENCER’S RUSSIAN FRIEND TURNS OUT TO BE AN FSB OFFICER WITH TIES TO THE WAGNER GROUP. The Insider unpacks the curious case of “Elizabeth Lane” — born Iza Bendianishvili, a Georgia-born aspiring MAGA influencer boosted onto the conspiracy-podcast circuit by Tucker Carlson and Candace Owens — whose Russian boyfriend turns out to be FSB officer Dmitry Grizdak, a Spetsnaz operative attached to both Kadyrov’s Akhmat Battalion and the Wagner Group.

This was VSquare’s 68th Goulash newsletter. I hope you gobbled it up. Come back soon for another serving. 

Still hungry? Check the previous newsletter issues here! 

SZABOLCS PANYI & THE VSQUARE TEAM