Goulash: Orbán’s UN Immunity Plan; Kremlin’s Psyop Docs Leaked; Gruevski Became Hungarian

FRESH FROM VSQUARE

LEAKED RUSSIAN DOCS REVEAL ‘COGNITIVE STRIKES’ ON THE WEST – INCLUDING ‘PIG HEAD’ ATTACKS IN PARIS

Leaked chats and documents obtained by Delfi Estonia and shared with OCCRP and partners – including VSquare – expose the Russian presidential administration’s hands-on management of the Social Design Agency’s “cognitive strikes” against the West: pig heads at Paris mosques, green paint on synagogues, sex dolls in the Seine, and a cozy plan to splinter Central Europe into a Moscow-friendly “Vienna Agreement.” The Kremlin, it turns out, has a very busy creative department. Read the story here.

ORBÁN’S FOREIGN PAYROLL: HOW HUNGARY SPENT A FORTUNE TO BUY INFLUENCE ON THE WESTERN RIGHT

Átlátszó obtained contracts showing that the Danube Institute – Orbán’s cozy hub for the global populist right – quietly doubled its payouts to foreign fellows in 2025, distributing over €1.1 million in Hungarian public funds to MAGA figures, British conservatives, and other admirers just before the election that sent Orbán’s regime packing. The fellows were expected to earn their keep by appearing in media and networking tirelessly – spreading the message that Orbán’s Hungary is a model for the world. Read the full investigation here.

HOW CHINESE SURVEILLANCE CAMERAS PENETRATED CZECH MILITARY AND CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

Investigace.cz mapped how cameras from Chinese state-owned firms Hikvision and Dahua ended up monitoring Czech army weapons depots, military bases, railway networks, police headquarters, the Supreme Court — and even the facade of the very cyber agency that warned against using them. Czech institutions’ defense? The cameras aren’t connected to the internet, which cybersecurity experts politely note is not quite the same as being secure. Read it here.

SPICY SCOOPS

There is always a lot of information that we hear and find interesting and newsworthy but don’t publish as part of our investigative reporting — and share instead in this newsletter.

THE MAGA WORLD MAY HAVE A PLAN FOR ORBÁN’S NEXT ACT – AND IT COMES WITH IMMUNITY

Multiple sources – foreign and Hungarian, all with wide diplomatic networks – have told me about a scenario originating from US MAGA circles regarding Viktor Orbán’s possible next career move. The idea is to secure him a high-ranking position at the United Nations. The specific portfolio is apparently secondary and largely unimportant; what matters is the diplomatic immunity that a senior UN appointment would carry. That immunity would be significant – but its scope depends on the specific role. Under the 1946 UN Convention on Privileges and Immunities, only the Secretary-General, Under-Secretaries-General, and Assistant Secretaries-General receive full diplomatic immunity equivalent to that of an ambassador – meaning protection from virtually all legal processes, including criminal prosecution, for themselves, their spouses and minor children. Heads of specialized agencies also have full diplomatic immunity under the convention. However, lower-ranking UN senior officials enjoy narrower functional immunity: protection from legal proceedings only for acts carried out in their official capacity, not for actions taken before or outside their UN role.

One source added that, besides possible US support, Orbán could also count on Argentina’s President Javier Milei, who – like JD Vance – visited him in Budapest before the April election. This detail matters because the race to succeed António Guterres as UN Secretary-General is already underway, and the current frontrunner is Rafael Grossi, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency – an Argentine. A Milei-backed candidacy push for Orbán would fit neatly into that diplomatic ecosystem. The immunity angle is not the only thread worth pulling. As I reported on my Hungarian-language Substack last month, Orbán is set to travel to the US this summer for the football World Cup, while Orbán’s daughter Ráhel and son-in-law István Tiborcz have already relocated to New York, providing a ready family base. Sources close to the former PM have told me that if the political ground in Budapest grows too hot, Orbán could end up staying in Trump’s America for considerably longer than a football match. And a job at the UN would present him with a graceful exit — not having to apply for political asylum to fight extradition. Of course, it’s important to stress that the scenario about Orbán’s UN gig is still very early and there are many ways it could be derailed – for example, by becoming public too early. ¯\_(ツ)_/¯

Meanwhile, Orbán was just asked by Hungarian RTL television whether he feared that he or a family member could end up in court as part of the new Magyar government’s push to investigate crimes committed under his regime. “Me? Come on, why would I. I follow the law and enforce it. I took an oath on that, I’ve kept all my oaths, and I’ll keep this one too. Anything else you’d like to know?,” Orbán replied.

GRUEVSKI HAS HUNGARIAN CITIZENSHIP – AND IS LIKELY STILL IN BUDAPEST

When PM Péter Magyar promised that Hungary would no longer serve as a safe haven for international criminals, the two most prominent residents of Orbán’s fugitive shelter took note. Former Polish justice minister Zbigniew Ziobro, who received asylum after his escape to Hungary in 2025, surfaced at Newark Liberty Airport in May; his former deputy Marcin Romanowski, who had fled to Budapest in late 2024 on charges of misuse of public funds, reportedly did not make it into the US and has since been spotted in Serbia and Croatia, with Polish services reportedly closing in.

Hungary, however, remains a safe haven for at least one longer-standing guest. A Hungarian government source confirmed to me that Nikola Gruevski – the former North Macedonian prime minister who has been living in Budapest since 2018 – was granted full Hungarian citizenship on grounds of “Hungarian state interest” in 2022. According to another government source, he is believed to still be in Hungary. Gruevski’s position is also considerably more secure than it ever was for the Poles: while political asylum can be revoked, full citizenship is a far harder status to strip, giving Gruevski a level of legal protection that Magyar’s promises cannot easily reach. Stripping him of his citizenship requires proving that he acquired it fraudulently or through corruption. In the latter case — since the basis for the citizenship was Hungarian state interest — prosecutors would need to show that heads of the Orbán regime were involved in those corrupt dealings. Which, of course, is not entirely impossible.

Gruevski fled North Macedonia in November 2018, days before he was due to start serving a two-year sentence in the “Tank” case – a corruption conviction involving the purchase of a €600,000 bulletproof, luxury Mercedes. He crossed into Albania, then through Montenegro and Serbia, reportedly with the help of a Hungarian diplomatic vehicle and, according to reports at the time, the involvement of Hungary’s foreign intelligence service, the Information Office (IH). Orbán’s government duly granted him political asylum, in what Serbian weekly Vreme described as a “VIP refugee” arrangement. North Macedonia’s opposition Social Democratic Union (SDSM) has separately claimed Gruevski holds both a Hungarian and a Serbian passport — raising questions about just how many travel documents a convicted fugitive can accumulate with the right friends. (Hungary’s government didn’t reply to my request for comment.)

VISEGRÁD FUND-SUPPORTED RUSSIAN DISINFO CONFERENCE CANCELED IN HUNGARY – JUST BEFORE THE ELECTION

Corvinus University, Hungary’s top higher education institution, canceled a March 19 venue for a Visegrád Fund-supported project conference on Russian disinformation just weeks before Hungary’s decisive April 12 election. The project was led by Associate Professor András Rácz — Hungary’s foremost Russia expert — and focused on Russian disinformation related to the war in Ukraine in 2022–2023. The cancellation came less than a week before the event, by which point the hotel was already booked and foreign participants had purchased flights. University sources say Corvinus leadership told organizers they were worried about the project’s domestic political resonance, and first tried to downgrade the event to a closed expert workshop — but that was not an option, since the Visegrád Fund contract explicitly required a public event with a press conference.

The fallout was significant: university senator Dr. Eszter Kirs resigned from the senate in protest, and Rácz announced leaving Corvinus. The University Senate held a special session on March 17 to debate the issue. On March 27, rector Bruno van Pottelsberghe sent a letter to faculty members using the phrase “adjust the timing” to describe what happened, insisting it was “only an additional postponement, of a few weeks, not a cancellation.” He also cited Corvinus’s founding charter, which prohibits direct political activities, as justification. Rácz declined to comment on the university’s decision but confirmed the research contained no political implications regarding any of the Visegrád countries. The strictly academic project examined how Russian disinformation channels covered three events of the war in Ukraine across the Visegrád countries: the bombing of the Mariupol maternity hospital (March 2022), the Bucha massacre (April 2022), and the destruction of the Nova Kakhovka dam (June 2023).

All three occurred events took place years before Hungary’s April 2026 election and had nothing to do with Hungarian politics – besides, of course, the Orbán regime’s vilification of Ukraine, its denial of Russian interference in the Hungarian election campaign, and its promotion of pro-Kremlin narratives through GRU-linked propagandists while serving Russian interests in Brussels and beyond. In a reply to my request for comment, Corvinus basically reiterated the rector’s arguments and cited other technicalities for the postponement. The university denied pressure applied by the Orbán government. However, the backdrop matters: Corvinus was the first Hungarian university privatized under Orbán, transferred to a foundation dominated by MOL, Hungary’s oil company – which has continued to profit from trading Russian oil throughout the war. Despite the defeat of Viktor Orbán’s government, Corvinus’s leadership remains filled with Orbán regime loyalists. The conference is now scheduled for June 1.

BREWING IN THE BOTTOM

VSquare’s Tamara Kaňuchová talked with experts to explain what’s happening to Czech diplomacy.

Turning the Czech MFA into a ‘Klausoleum.’ Czech minister of foreign affairs Petr Macinka, coming from the far-right populist Motorists party, introduced his new advisory team earlier this month. And not coincidentally, a large part of this new team is connected to the Václav Klaus Institute (IVK), a right-wing think-tank founded in 2012 by former President Václav Klaus (2003-2013), his two sons, and President Klaus’s former chancellor, Jiří Weigl. Macinka himself also used to work along Klaus in the communications team of IVK. “Petr Macinka is systematically bringing in people from Václav Klaus’s circle who have his back and are now in key positions at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” Pavel Havlíček, from Prague-based Association for International Affairs (AMO) told VSquare. Jiří Weigl, Jindřich Forejt, the chief of the protocol under presidents Klaus and Miloš Zeman, now an analyst at IVK, and IVK analyst Filip Šebesta all joined Macinka’s team. The gathering of people close to the Václav Klaus Institute at the Czech MFA already has a name: “Klausoleum.” 

“And that’s really the case— with reference to the “Klausoleum,” it’s a collection of people who often carry with them significant problematic backgrounds, including ties to Russia or China,” said Havlíček. “That team is really a group of pragmatists and businesspeople — people who primarily distance themselves from the values-based foreign policy that was previously advocated for. There is a significant degree of distancing, in a negative, antagonistic way of effectively trampling on the legacy of the past, whether that of Havel or the previous government,” Havlíček added.

Macinka had already started the reorganization of the ministry last December, effectively closing down or changing departments focused on efforts to fight disinformation or strengthen cybersecurity and resilience against hybrid threats coming from China and Russia – as well as replacing personnel. Employees of the ministry are scared about changes that might come into the department dealing with sanctions, which, for example, had managed to sanction the Voice of Europe Russian influence network last year.

Even though she was not a member of the IVK, Czech ex-ambassador in Syria, Eva Filipi, also made it to the team. Filipi was controversial for accepting a state award from the Syrian dictator Bashar al-Asad at the end of her mission. Macinka awarded her as well for her contribution to diplomacy. She will now be his expert advisor on the Middle East. Rounding out the team are Pavel Šik, an economist; Pavel Janeček, former chairman of the board of Prague’s Gas Supplier; and journalist Iveta Křížová, who will now head communications.

MORE FROM OUR PARTNERS

If you like our scoops and stories, here are some more articles from our partners!

KUCIAK MURDER INTERMEDIARY AGAIN TESTIFIED AGAINST KOČNER AND ZSUZSOVÁ — AND NAMED GAŠPAR AND KOVÁČIK. The Investigative Center of Ján Kuciak reports on the third trial over the murder of investigative journalist Ján Kuciak and the planned killings of prosecutors, where key witness and murder intermediary Zoltán Andruško once  again testified that Marian Kočner ordered the killing — but this time also brought new details not previously heard in court, naming former police chief Tibor Gašpar and businessman Norbert Bödör, among others. (Text in Slovak.)

ALLEGED WAR CRIMINAL CO-OWNS A COMPANY IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC WITH A RUSSIAN POLITICIAN. Investigace.cz writes that Alexey Moldavantsev — accused by Ukraine’s SBU of running the occupation police in Nova Kakhovka that kidnapped and tortured civilians — holds a 50 percent stake in a Brno-based shell company co-owned with a member of Russia’s far-right LDPR party. (Text in Czech.)

SHE POKED THE CHILD IN THE BACK WITH A KNIFE, YET EVERYONE THOUGHT SHE WAS AN EXEMPLARY FOSTER PARENT. Direkt36 investigated Hungary’s flawed foster care system, where abusive foster parents routinely pass mandatory reviews undetected — and a chronic shortage of carers means the pressure to fill spots consistently overrides proper screening. (Text in English and Hungarian.)

DESSERT AND FURTHER READINGS

For those still hungry for more, we’re finishing today’s menu with a couple of recommendations from our friends and colleagues.

POLISH ACADEMICS PROTEST UNDERFUNDING OF SCIENCE AND HIGHER EDUCATION. Notes from Poland reports on researchers taking to the streets of Warsaw to demand Poland nearly triple its science spending to 3 percent of GDP — pointing out that the 20th largest economy in the world currently spends just 1.1 percent, leaving PhD holders earning close to minimum wage.

WHY ARE RUSSIA’S MOST RECENT THREATS AGAINST THE BALTIC COUNTRIES MORE SERIOUS THAN BEFORE? In his The Baltic Flank newsletter, Holger Roonemaa, Sanita Jemberga (Re:Baltica) and Miglė Krancevičiūtė (Siena.lt) break down Russia’s escalating rhetorical offensive against the Baltics — including a direct SVR threat against Latvia and a wave of drone incursions — in an emergency podcast recorded as yet another air alert sounded overhead.

HOW AIR-DEFENSE FAILURES BROUGHT DOWN LATVIA’S GOVERNMENT. Tomas Hrivnak, in his How We Cee It Substack, writes on how two stray Ukrainian drones crashing into an abandoned Latvian oil depot — unintercepted, with air alerts sent only after the fact — triggered a cascade of resignations that brought down the entire Latvian government.

MR. ROBOT AT THE POWER PLANT. Our own Tamara Kaňuchová explains in The European Correspondent why Europe’s energy grids — from Dutch solar panels to Polish nuclear research centres — are facing a surge of cyberattacks, and why the growing complexity of smart grid technology is making them harder, not easier, to defend.

“NATO’S FRACTURE AND A NEW MILITARY BLOC RISING”: THE KREMLIN’S EUROPEAN NARRATIVES. EK Strategic Communications Center maps how Russian propaganda is simultaneously pushing two contradictory narratives — NATO is collapsing from within, and Europe is aggressively rearming to attack Russia — and explains why the Kremlin needs both to be true at once.

This was VSquare’s 66th Goulash newsletter. I hope you gobbled it up. Come back soon for another serving. 

Still hungry? Check the previous newsletter issues here! 

SZABOLCS PANYI & THE VSQUARE TEAM