Goulash: Orban money in a foreign election, again; Putin’s troll factory helps the far-right

FRESH FROM VSQUARE

LEAKED FILES FROM PUTIN’S TROLL FACTORY: HOW RUSSIA MANIPULATED EUROPEAN ELECTIONS

Let’s start with this international investigation: a juicy leak exposing Russia’s Social Design Agency (SDA) and its meddling in European elections through disinformation campaigns – in coordination with Russian intelligence services. According to one of the leaked internal reports, the SDA’s bot army, or the “Russian Digital Army,” generated a whopping 33.9 million comments and tens of thousands of other online content, including videos and memes, spreading Kremlin narratives. Why? “The European Parliament elections are in the summer of 2024. Critical milestones are approaching in 2024, including the Bundestag elections and the U.S. presidential election. The outcome of these campaigns will largely determine the West’s future sanctions policy towards Russia and support for Ukraine,” another internal document brazenly reveals. Read the whole story, authored by Delfi’s Martin Laine and our Anastasiia Morozova, here.

HUNGARIAN AND CEE “PEACE” MOVEMENTS SERVE THE KREMLIN’S INTERESTS

Did you know that in 1949, the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) launched its “world peace campaign” in Budapest? History seems to be repeating itself. This fresh analysis by Lóránt Győri from the Political Capital Institute highlights Hungary’s crucial role in promoting a new, Kremlin-aligned “peace campaign” throughout Central Europe. Of course, “peace” here translates to Ukraine’s unconditional surrender to Russian aggression. Győri reveals how far-left and far-right Hungarian groups with connections to Russian intelligence began cooperating under the guise of this new “peace movement” (mentioning our earlier investigation into the role of undercover GRU officer Anton Goriev). Győri also looks at how these extremist groups’ ideas became mainstream when Viktor Orbán’s government – surprise! – joined the initiative in 2022. Read the analysis here.

BIG BROTHER IN BRATISLAVA: DOES ROBERT FICO HAVE PEGASUS?

The fact that Slovakia’s prime minister denies having obtained the infamous Israeli spyware is not particularly significant – similar spyware surveillance scandals in Hungary and Poland were also initially met with official denials. VSquare’s Tamara Kaňuchová places the recent worrying developments in Slovakia within this regional context and summarizes everything we know – and don’t know – about the Fico government’s recent spyware acquisition, and about how the parliamentary oversight committee that could provide us with answers is being obstructed. Read it here.

HUNGARY CONNECTION: ORBÁN’S ELITE BODYGUARDS PROTECT GEERT WILDERS

Regular Goulash consumers may recall my scoop from our past two issues about how the most influential Dutch politician is receiving red carpet treatment – and security protection – from his friend and ally, Viktor Orbán. In a separate article, Tamara Kaňuchová summarizes what we know about Wilders’s decades-old connection to Hungary, as well as our recent reporting on the special care that the Hungarian Counter Terrorism Center provides for Wilders. Read the story here.

SPICY SCOOPS

There is always a lot of information that we hear and find interesting and newsworthy but don’t publish as part of our investigative reporting — and share instead in this newsletter. 

SAME ORBÁN-LINKED FINANCIAL FORCES THAT FUNDED LE PEN’S CAMPAIGN SUSPECTED OF FUNDING SPAIN’S FAR-RIGHT VOX PARTY 

Spain’s El País recently reported that an unnamed financial institution with close ties to Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán bankrolled the far-right Vox party’s 2023 campaigns in both parliamentary and municipal elections. Vox, in violation of Spanish election law, refuses to reveal the exact source of the reported loans, which, taken together, were worth €9.2 million in total. However, the description El País provided points to three possible Hungarian banks: Gránit Bank, largely owned by the Orbán family (via the prime minister’s son-in-law, István Tiborcz); the state-owned Eximbank; and MBH Bank, a financial behemoth formed from the merger of three state-owned institutions. MBH is largely owned by Lőrinc Mészáros, Hungary’s richest businessman and Orbán’s childhood friend, whom the Hungarian opposition has dubbed “Orbán’s wallet.” This bank is well-known for financing Orbánworld’s political and economic expansion inside and outside of Hungary. 

Several well-connected business and financial sources tell me that, if El País’s reporting is correct, the size and nature of Vox’s loans mean it almost certainly came from MBH. Moreover, a source with ties to MBH told me that the bank’s senior management became noticeably jumpy after El País’s story broke, adding that they already have existing problems with foreign correspondent banks, which have grown increasingly wary of MBH’s more politically questionable dealings. And let’s not forget: one of MBH’s predecessor banks, MKB Bank (also owned by Lőrinc Mészáros), famously financed Marine Le Pen’s 2022 presidential campaign through a €10.7 million personal loan. 

Why are the other two Orbán-linked banks unlikely candidates? Gránit Bank is still considered too small to provide a loan of this magnitude, and its direct ownership by the Orbán family makes lending to a foreign political party particularly risky. Eximbank, on the other hand, only finances businesses – and was recently busy trying to help facilitate a Hungarian takeover of Spanish rail manufacturer Talgo. That plan fell apart some weeks ago when Spanish intelligence uncovered a Russia-linked national security risk, which promptly torpedoed the Hungarian bid. It’s extremely unlikely – as it would have been extremely counterproductive – that, at the same time, Eximbank was also financing the left-wing Spanish government’s far-right opposition. Naturally, I reached out to MBH Bank with some detailed questions. Their response? Silence. (For more about Hungarian meddling in foreign elections, I have a couple of suggestions: “How Orbán flooded Central Europe with millions of online ads during election season” and “Goulash: Orbán’s campaign operatives in foreign elections”.)

UKRAINE SENDS NEW AMBASSADOR TO POLAND – FROM TURKEY

Many hoped that last year’s Polish election marked the end of the decline in Polish-Ukrainian relations that began under the previous Law and Justice government. But tensions still remain, as the latest visit to Kyiv by Polish foreign minister Radosław Sikorski exposed, and there’s a lot of work waiting for the next Ukrainian ambassador to Poland. While the name is not yet public, Ukrainian government and government-connected sources revealed to me that it’s Vasyl Bodnar, current Ukrainian ambassador to Turkey, who will take over the helm of the Ukrainian Embassy in Warsaw ( his predecessor, Vasyl Zvarych, was recently reassigned from Warsaw to Prague). My sources describe Bodnar as a professional career diplomat who has a good relationship with the new Ukrainian foreign minister, Andrii Sybiha. Bodnar previously served as a Ukrainian diplomat in Poland from 2006 to 2010 and was later a deputy foreign minister from 2017 to 2021. When he became ambassador to Turkey in 2021, he actually succeeded Sybiha – who is now his boss. Interestingly, Sybiha had also served as a diplomat in Warsaw and speaks fluent Polish – but it’s yet to be seen if their deeper understanding of Poland would help solve recurring historical grievances, such as the one over the 1943-44 Volhynia/Wołyń massacre.

UKRAINE’S DESIGNATED AMBASSADOR TO HUNGARY STILL IN LIMBO

Speaking of tensions with Ukraine and new ambassadors… Back in March 2023, I had a scoop about President Volodymyr Zelensky considering Sandor Fedir for the role of Ukraine’s ambassador to Hungary. Fedir, who is partly of Hungarian descent and is a professor at Uzhhorod National University, gained fame on social media in 2022 for continuing to give lectures online from the battlefield while fighting against Russian invaders. Despite Fedir’s appointment eventually becoming official, with his agrément (document on the appointment sent to the host country) filed and accepted by the Hungarian government, he never arrived at his posting and it’s unclear if he ever will. According to Ukrainian officials and government-connected sources I’ve spoken to, internal disagreements and opposition to Fedir’s appointment – especially within the Ukrainian foreign ministry – led to a loss of support for his candidacy. Initially, his sudden social media fame and partial Hungarian background seemed to make him a candidate capable of improving Ukraine’s image in Hungary’s increasingly hostile environment. However, his shortcomings soon came to light. My sources close to the Ukrainian government told me that many officials in the Ukrainian foreign ministry deemed him unqualified for the job due to his lack of experience in diplomacy. It also didn’t help that he gave multiple interviews and comments expressing his personal views on Ukrainian-Hungarian affairs, which didn’t always align with official policy. 

SECOND HELPINGS

We’d already reported but the story went on… here’s a second bite of our previous stories and scoops.

Hungary’s next EU commissioner is still a mystery. Officially, Orbán re-nominated Olivér Várhelyi, knowing that he’s simply too controversial to survive committee nomination hearings at the European Parliament. Unofficially, senior Fidesz MEP Enikő Győri has been the frontrunner since at least early 2024, as I previously reported in Goulash. We now know that Hungary will get the new Commission’s least influential portfolio: health and ₍ᐢ･⚇･ᐢ₎ animal welfare. But the latest rumor in Brussels is that Győri is not  interested in the job anymore. The new name in the air – first reported by Portfolio.hu – is Bernadett Petri, an EU expert and ministerial commissioner with almost zero name recognition in politics

Budapest’s Olympics bid makes no sense, but there’s a grand coalition building around it anyway. Another of our Goulash scoops that has aged – or simmered, if you like – well: Back in late June, this newsletter was the first to report that Budapest’s opposition-led leadership and the Orbán government are engaged in backchannel communication over a new Olympic bid. Despite initial protestations from Budapest mayor Gergely Karácsony, who technically only denied direct and formal negotiations with the government, Orbán and then the mayor himself have now publicly talked about a bid. “If we want to, we can bring the ’36 [Games] here,” Orbán said in late August. However, multiple experts I’ve talked to flat-out told me there’s actually almost zero chance of this happening. “Unless we seriously bribe everyone,” a government-connected source jokingly added (at least, I hope it was a joke). The source highlighted that even Poland abandoned its original 2036 bid for a more realistic 2040 or 2044. (The Olympic Games are usually rotated between continents these days, and 2036 is expected to be Asia’s turn.)

Orbán’s dacha is becoming a problem. “Orbán runs Hungary from his Habsburg estate-turned-dacha” proved to be one of the most popular scoops of this newsletter so far. It even led to three (failed) attempts by Hungary’s parliamentary opposition to officially scrutinize Orbán for failing to list a €30 million mansion in his annual asset declarations. Nevertheless, the dacha – officially owned by his billionaire father – is almost completely finished. The place is so complete that the swimming pool has water in it, as recent aerial photographs have shown. According to a government-connected source, the whole issue of the Hatvanpuszta estate is increasingly seen as a liability, and there’s brainstorming around what to do with it. Of course, it doesn’t mean that the estate will suddenly be offered to serve charity purposes. Current thinking is more along the lines of looking into how to block audiovisual recording around the estate through legal or physical means.

MORE FROM OUR PARTNERS

FILES FROM THE TROLL FACTORY. FRONTSTORY.PL’s local story, based on the Russian Social Design Agency (SDA) leak, focuses on the Kremlin’s plans to build a new center for influence operations in Kaliningrad, targeting the Baltics, Poland and Germany. (Text in Polish.)

NGO THAT REVEALED SAMSUNG’S POLLUTION TARGETED BY SOVEREIGNTY PROTECTION OFFICE. After first going after VSquare’s Hungarian partner Atlatszo.hu and Transparency International Hungary, the Orbán government’s Russia-style Sovereignty Protection Office is now targeting two more NGOs: one is an environmental group that protests against battery factories, while the other is Átlátszónet, a non-profit foundation supporting Atlatszo.hu’s work. (Text in Hungarian and English.)

DISINFORMATION ABOUT IVAN KORČOK AS A STB AGENT WAS SPREAD BY TROLLS BEFORE THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS. The Investigative Center of Ján Kuciak (ICJK.sk) analyzed a viral hoax about the former Slovak presidential candidate, and found that it was largely spread by fake Facebook accounts. (Text in Slovak.)

DIRTY MONEY FROM DONBAS FINANCED TELEGRAM. MILLIONS OF EUROS ALSO FLOWED FROM THE CZECH REPUBLIC. Investigace.cz’s article focuses on the Czech thread of iStories’ investigation into Telegram’s financing. Besides money from the sanctioned sale of Donbas raw materials by pro-Russian companies, there was also money flowing in from a Czech shell company. (Text in Czech.)

This was VSquare’s 27th Goulash newsletter. I hope you gobbled it up. Come back soon for another serving. 

Still hungry? Check the previous newsletter issues here! 

SZABOLCS PANYI & THE VSQUARE TEAM